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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989 Maine enacted the Comprehensive Planning and Land
Use Regulation Act.' The Act's legislative findings declared that
"[t]he State has a vital interest in ensuring that a comprehensive
system of land-use planning and growth management is established
as quickly as possible.' 2 However, whenever the state exercises its
police power to regulate private land use, it faces a constitutional
limit as to how far it can go.' When the land-use restriction exceeds
1. Ma. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4311 (West Supp. 1990-1991). amended by P.L.
1991, ch. 622 (effective Dec. 23, 1991).
2. § 4312(1) (H).
3. This Comment addresses resolution of the taking question under the Maine
Constitution only. The taking clause provides that: "Private property shall not be
taken for public uses without just compensation." M. CoNsT. art. I, § 21. The
equivalent language in the United States Constitution is located in the Fifth Amend-
ment: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This provision applies to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment. See Chicago, B. & Q. PR. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
However, "[tihough 'taking' arguments and analysis implicate provisions of the
United States Constitution, it should be noted that every state constitution has ex-
press or implied provisions that parallel the federal language. Thus, the 'taking argu-
ment' may be raised in each state as a matter of state law." ORLANoo . DFLOGU.
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that limit, a regulatory taking occurs. The Maine Supreme Judicial
Court, sitting as the Law Court, has written:
Both the United States and the Maine Constitutions prohibit the
government from taking private property for public purposes with-
out just compensation. The traditional statement of the rule appli-
cable to the constitutionality of "taking" was formulated by Justice
Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon: "The general rule at
least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. 4
This Comment argues that the Comprehensive Planning and Land
Use Regulation Act, as it is being interpreted and implemented by
state and local officials across the state, encourages growth manage-
ment regulation that goes too far. When regulation under the Act is
applied too aggressively, it violates the Taking Clause of the Maine
Constitution.5
This argument is based upon the premise that there exists in
Maine law a standard for determining when a regulatory taking oc-
curs. The problem, however, is that taking decisions by the Law
Court have been fact-specific and seemingly unrelated.' All but one
of Maine's taking cases have involved an as-applied challenge to the
land-use restriction rather than a facial challenge to the statute."
MAINE LAND USE CONTROL LAW CASES, NOTES, COMMENTS (forthcoming 1992) (manu-
script at 96, on file with author).
4. Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation Comm'n, 450 A.2d 475,
482 (Me. 1982) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922))
(citation omitted).
5. Aggressive regulation under the Act also prompts angry reaction from private
landowners. Three years after the Act's passage, it has become apparent that compre-
hensive land-use plans formulated pursuant to the Act are meeting "stiff local opposi-
tion." Christine Kukka, Comprehensive land use plans face tough sledding, MAINE
TimES, week beginning Oct. 25, 1991, at 19, 21. For instance, ten of fifty-six towns
that prepared comprehensive plans have had them rejected by voters. Id. at 19. In
several of those towns, citizens rejected the plans because officials attempted to es-
tablish large-lot zoning schemes in certain areas of the towns. Id. at 19, 21. This Com-
ment contends that landowners who oppose the more extreme of such plans may find
strong legal support in the Maine Constitution's taking clause. See infra part V.
6. See State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 715 (Me. 1970) ("The determination of
unconstitutional deprivation is difficult and judicial decisions are diverse.").
7. In Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (1989), the Public Trust in Intertidal
Land Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 571-573 (West Supp. 1990-1991), was de-
clared facially unconstitutional. Addressing the importance of the difference between
as-applied and facial challenges to land-use regulation, the United States Supreme
Court has written: "The posture of the case is critical because we have recognized an
important distinction between a claim that the mere enactment of a statute consti-
tutes a taking and a claim that the particular impact of government action on a spe-
cific piece of property requires the payment of just compensation." Keystone Bitumi-
nous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 494 (1987). The difference is that as-
applied challenges "must be conducted with respect to specific property, and the par-
ticular estimates of economic impact and ultimate valuation relevant in the unique
circumstances." Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
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Consequently, "the principal focus of the Law Court in 'taking'
cases has become a factual inquiry" into the unique facts of each
case.8 Because of this ad hoc approach, it is difficult "to develop any
'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the
government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on
a few persons."9 This does not mean, however, that one is precluded
from deriving a general rule regarding the taking issue in Maine.'0
This Comment will demonstrate that upon comprehensive examina-
tion, a coherent test for resolving the taking question emerges from
the Maine case law.
The discussion proceeds in the following manner. The remainder
of this section gives a brief overview of the taking issue in Maine,
and then discusses how the Comprehensive Planning and Land Use
Regulation Act implicates taking law. Section II traces the standard
that the Law Court has developed to resolve taking challenges to
land-use regulations. Section IH identifies the major factors in
Maine case law important in applying the Law Court's taking stan-
dard. Section IV summarizes where the taking cases suggest the
limit to government land-use regulation currently exists in Maine.
Since a thorough review of the taking issue in Maine has not previ-
ously been presented, a significant portion of this Comment is de-
voted to Sections II-IV. Finally, the conclusion demonstrates how
growth management regulation, aggressively applied, exceeds consti-
tutional limits.
A. An Overview of Taking Law in Maine
During the course of over 150 years of adjudicating taking chal-
lenges," the Law Court has been consistently public interest ori-
ented.12 The court has rarely viewed the arguments of private land-
295 (1981). "The test to be applied in considering [a] facial challenge is fairly
straightforward." Id. It is whether the "mere enactment" of the ordinance "consti-
tutes a taking." Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
8. Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation Comm'n, 450 A.2d at
482.
9. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. at 295, quoted
in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 495.
10. See, e.g., DELOGU, supra note 3, manuscript at 96-97:
In any one state when a regulatory measure is questioned on "taking"
grounds, the large number of cases in existence (given that all 50 states
generate such cases) usually allows each side ... involved in the dispute to
find support somewhere in the case law for their position. The question
then is not, can a litigating party find state case law support for his "tak-
ing" position? They usually can. The real question is-is that support the
general rule (or a minority position) .... ?
11. The Law Court's treatment of the taking issue began with Wadleigh v.
Gilman, 12 Me. 403 (1835). See infra text accompanying notes 48-51.
12. "Some states are more developer, private property oriented. Other states are
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owners favorably. On only three occasions has the Law Court found
that enactment or application of a land-use statute constituted a
regulatory taking.13 In two of those cases, however, the challenged
regulation entailed some physical invasion of the landowner's prop-
erty, a situation in which the court is more likely to find a taking
regardless of the court's general orientation. 14 Nonetheless, the con-
clusion that the Law Court is predominantly public interest oriented
must be tempered by an awareness that throughout the court's his-
tory there have been relatively few taking cases. Most taking chal-
lenges have been incidental to the case in chief, and many taking
claims have been held deficient merely due to lack of evidence.
The Law Court has only periodically drawn upon United States
Supreme Court treatment of the taking question in formulating its
own test of a taking under the Maine Constitution. In State v.
Johnson,5 the court referred to the "guiding principle" of diminu-
tion of value introduced by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon.' In Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Reg-
ulation Commission,'17 the court incorporated into its analysis Su-
preme Court cases.'8 However, few of the Law Court's taking deci-
sions since Seven Islands have incorporated important United
States Supreme Court cases handed down since 1986.1' Conse-
quently, while the Law Court has occasionally followed the lead of
consistently more protective of public interests broadly defined. A third group of
states have attempted to stake out a middle ground. And, at any point in time, there
are states that are in transition." DELOGU, supra note 3, manuscript at 96.
13. The cases are: Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989); Brown v.
Warchalowski, 471 A.2d 1026 (Me. 1984); and State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me.
1970).
14. The cases are: Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) and Brown v.
Warchalowski, 471 A.2d 1026 (Me. 1984). See infra text accompanying notes 189-206.
15. 265 A.2d at 715.
16. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The "guiding principle" states that a major factor in de-
termining the limits to the government's exercise of police power is the "extent of the
diminution" of values incident to property. "When it reaches a certain magnitude, in
most if not all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation
to sustain the act." Id. at 413.
17. 450 A.2d 475 (Me. 1982).
18. See generally DELOGU, supra note 3, manuscript at 137 ("On the critical 'tak-
ing' issue, the most interesting aspect of the Law Court's reasoning is its ready adop-
tion of modern U.S. Supreme Court cases . . ").
19. These include: Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987);
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304 (1987) [hereinafter First Lutheran Church]; Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). Indeed, one observer has argued that the
Law Court, in Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989), incorrectly applied
Nollan, and neglected to draw upon even less recent precedent-Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 477 U.S. 74 (1980); and Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
See Alison Rieser, Public Trust, Public Use, and Just Compensation, 42 ME. L. RE.
5, 11-14 (1990).
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the United States Supreme Court, the standard that the Law Court
has developed under Maine's taking clause has evolved substantially
independently of the federal standard. Furthermore, whereas the
United States Supreme Court may recently have signalled a more
property oriented shift in its thinking on the taking issue, 20 the Law
Court has not yet indicated whether it will follow this shift.
B. Taking Law and the Growth Management Act
Since the inception of widespread environmental awareness in the
sixties and early seventies, Maine has enacted a series of state and
local land-use regulations designed to protect the state's natural re-
20. The United States Supreme Court held for private property interests in two of
its last three taking cases. In First Lutheran Church, which held that the Fifth
Amendment requires compensation for temporary regulatory takings, the Court
wrote:
We realize that.., our present holding will undoubtedly lessen to some
extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners and governing bod-
ies of municipal corporations when enacting land-use regulations. But such
consequences necessarily flow from any decision upholding a claim of con-
stitutional right; many of the provisions of the Constitution are designed to
limit the flexibility and freedom of governmental authorities, and the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment is one of them. As Justice
Holmes aptly noted more than 50 years ago, "a strong public desire to im-
prove the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by
a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416.
First Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 321-22.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, the Court held that imposing a public
easement permit condition on a building restriction resulted in a taking because there
was a lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the restriction.
See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. at 837. The Court emphasized its
emerging philosophy- "We view the Fifth Amendments Property Clause to be more
than a pleading requirement, and compliance with it to be more than an exercise in
cleverness and imagination." Id. at 841.
In contrast, the Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis held
that a state law regulating the extent of coal mining in order to prevent subsidence
damage did not on its face constitute a taking without just compensation. See Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 501-02.
The Court, however, may now be preparing to distance itself from the Keystone
decision. Recently the Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the taking question
in a shorelands case from South Carolina. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3374 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1991) (No.
91-453). In Lucas, the petitioner was precluded from building on his beachfront prop-
erty due to development restrictions imposed by a state statute. The state Court of
Common Pleas held that the statute worked a regulatory taking, and awarded peti-
tioner $1,232,387.50 as just compensation. Id. at 895-96.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina, however, following Keystone, found that a
taking had not occurred and reversed. The court characterized the petitioner's posi-
tion as that of the dissent in Keystone. Id. at 896. As a result, how the United States
Supreme Court decides Lucas will indicate whether the property-oriented shift sig-
nalled in First Lutheran Church and Nollan is an anomaly, or is now the prevailing
view.
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sources. Most of these private land-use restrictions have withstood
taking challenges.2 Nonetheless, the Maine Legislature found that
during the last decade "[tihe pace of land speculation and develop-
ment [had] accelerated and outstripped the capacity of the State
and municipalities to manage this growth under existing state and
local laws."22 In response, the Legislature enacted the Comprehen-
sive Planning and Land Use Regulation Act (hereinafter the Growth
Management Act) in 1989.23 The Act's first goal is "[t]o encourage
orderly growth and development in appropriate areas of each com-
munity, while protecting the State's rural character, making efficient
use of public services and preventing development sprawl."
2 4
The Growth Management Act provides for a program of munici-
pal inventorying, planning, and zoning.2 6 It neither preempts earlier
state land-use legislation, nor introduces any new regulatory tech-
niques. Instead, the Act sets up a planning process through which
existing state and local land-use regulation can be incorporated into
a town's growth management strategy.26 However, the Growth Man-
agement Act differs from previous land-use regulation in its scope,
involvement, and objectives. The Act has the potential to affect
nearly every private landowner statewide.2 7 The Act encourages
21. For example, the "as-applied" constitutionality of the Site Location of Devel-
opment Act has been upheld. See infra text accompanying notes 81-91. Land Use
Regulatory Commission deeryard zoning has also been upheld. See infra text accom-
panying notes 92-105. Application of Maine's Sand Dune Law has been upheld as
well. See infra text accompanying notes 119-24.
22. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4312(1)(C) (West Supp. 1990-1991).
23. § 4311.
24. § 4312(3) (A).
25. From passage of the Act until the close of 1991, the provisions of the Growth
Management Act were mandates to be implemented by all municipalities. However,
as part of an overall strategy to resolve the state's budget crisis, Maine's 115th Legis-
lature amended the Act to make its provisions optional. P.L. 1991, ch. 622, §§ F-23,
F-28, F-29 (effective Dec. 23,1991). Municipalities now have the option of preparing a
local growth management program with a comprehensive plan designating growth
and rural areas. While the recent action by the Legislature reduces regulatory pres-
sure from the state, the provisions of the Act can still be implemented aggressively by
municipalities exercising their option. Thus, if a municipality chooses to implement a
local growth management program in accordance with the Act's guidance, the thesis
of this Comment is still valid.
26. "At a minimum, local ordinances must be consistent with The Natural Re-
sources Protection Act [ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 480-A to 480-T (West 1989 &
Supp. 1990-1991)], The Endangered Species Act [ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7751-
7758 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990-1991)], and The Mandatory Shoreland Zoning Act
[ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 435]." OFFICE OF COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING, MAINE
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, GUIDELINES FOR THE COM-
PREHENSIVE PLANNING AND LAND USE REGULATION ACT 49 (1988) [hereinafter
GUIDELINES].
27. "The Act requires each municipality in the state, except those municipalities
within the jurisdiction of the Maine Land Use Regulation Commission, to develop a
local growth management program . . " Id. at 1. Note, however, that the provisions
[Vol. 44:99
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greater citizen and government participation than other land-use
regulations.28 The Act focuses not only on preventing environmental
damage, but also on protecting the state's rural character by pre-
serving open space and access to outdoor recreation areas. Conse-
quently, the Act allows more comprehensive regulation of private
land use than earlier restrictions. For this reason, the potential for
government to go beyond its constitutional restraints becomes
greater. Thus, the taking question assumes increased importance.
In general, the Act allows each municipality to adopt a compre-
hensive plan and an implementation program.2 0  However,
"[d]esignation of growth and rural areas is the heart of the planning
process."30 Specifically, the Act allows "municipalities [to] designate
at least two geographic areas-growth and rural areas-and develop
specific implementation strategies for guiding growth in these ar-
eas." '31 Growth areas are the areas where a municipality will direct
its commercial, residential, and industrial growth over the next ten
years.12 By definition, they present no taking difficulties. "Rural ar-
eas are those areas intended for resource production and other allied
land use as well as the long-term protection of significant areas with
natural, cultural, scenic, or recreational values. '13 3 By definition, ru-
ral-area zoning raises the taking question.
The avowed purpose of applying land-use restrictions to rural ar-
eas is to "discourage growth, particularly development that is in-
compatible with rural resources."'3 Emphasis is placed not only on
protecting critical environmental areas from degradation, but on
maintaining the "rural landscapes which are important to the char-
acter of the municipality." 35 Consequently, rural areas should in-
clude: agricultural and forest lands important to the local or regional
economy; rural landscapes and other scenic open-space areas; land
areas consisting of large contiguous open space, farmland, or
forestland, or land areas in which the predominant pattern of devel-
opment consists of homes interspersed among large open spaces, or
land areas containing other rural resources that significantly con-
of the Act have recently been made optional. See supra note 25 and accompanying
text.
28. One of the legislative purposes of the Act is to provide for state, regional,
local, and citizen participation. See title 30-A, § 4312(2).
29. § 4326.
30. Josie Quintrell, Growth and Rural Areas: What It Means for Your Town,
MAINE TOWNSMAN, March 1990, at 6.
31. GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at 42.
32. § 4326(3) (A) (1).
33. Quintrell, supra note 30, at 6.
34. Id. at 7. The GUIDmLNEs state: "Development inconsistent with the value and
character of the rural [zone] should be discouraged." GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at
45.
35. GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at 44.
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tribute to the municipality's rural character; and, land areas in
which the municipality can ensure that the level and type of devel-
opment will be compatible with maintenance of rural character and
will not constitute or encourage development sprawl or strip devel-
opment along roads."6
As will be shown in subsequent sections of this Comment, the ru-
ral-zone designation implicates taking law in several ways. First, to
the extent that private landowners in rural areas are permitted to
pursue economically feasible natural-resource based development,
there should be no question that the rural-area designation does not
constitute a taking. The Law Court has clearly indicated that pri-
vate landowners have no right to insist upon pursuing the develop-
ment plan of their choice.37 As long as the restriction leaves them
some beneficial uses, no taking will occur.3 8 However, local planners
should be concerned that the forestry or agricultural potential of the
land represents an opportunity for more than token development.
The rural-zone designation must leave the private landowners with
uses that represent significant, real, and immediate economic
value.39
Second, planners should be cautious not to preclude all economic
uses of privately-owned open space in rural areas. The official
Guidelines for the Comprehensive Planning and Land Use Regula-
tion Act,40 promulgated by the Department of Economic and Com-
munity Development to assist local planners in their management of
rural areas, tend to mislead planners in the constitutional scope of
their ability to restrict private land uses in the rural areas. This
Comment will show that the advice in the GUIDELINES is so excessive
that, if it had the force of law, it would constitute a taking on its
face with no need for "as applied" arguments. 41
Third, maintenance of rural character may be a legitimate objec-
tive for exercising police power,4 but it presents difficulties from a
36. Quintrell, supra note 30, at 7.
37. See, e.g., In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736, 749 (Me. 1973) ("Appellant's
land cannot be sold for residential purposes while subdivided to the extent and in the
manner Lakesites originally planned.").
38. See Hall v. Board of Envtl. Protection, 528 A.2d 453, 454 (Me. 1987).
39. 39. See, e.g., id. at 456. In Hall, despite the denial of the building permit, the
Halls' property still had "beneficial and valuable uses" and adjacent property with
similar seasonal use had sold for "substantial sums." See infra text accompanying
notes 119-24.
40. GUIDELINES, supra note 26.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 216-18.
42. It seems analogous to regulations designed to protect aesthetic values, which
the United States Supreme Court approved in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), and which the Law Court has approved in Stewart v. In-
habitants of Durham, 451 A.2d 308 (Me. 1982). Nonetheless, the point is not without
skeptics. In one handbook for local planners prepared prior to the Growth Manage-
ment Act, the legal notes to the section on townwide zoning contend that courts will
[Vol. 44:99
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taking perspective. Land-use restrictions that seek to protect sensi-
tive environmental areas, such as sand dunes or wetlands, usually
withstand taking challenges because they are in the nature of nui-
sance control measures. It is more difficult to portray as laws pro-
tecting the public from harm such land-use restrictions as those
designed to preserve settings where the "predominant pattern of de-
velopment consists of homes interspersed among large open
spaces."4 Rather, such restrictions seem more like laws designed to
appropriate private land for public benefit. Consequently, the Law
Court may be more willing to hold that regulations designed to
maintain rural character, especially where degradation of sensitive
natural resources is not at issue, constitute uncompensated
takings.4
4
Fourth, the growth management program attempts to provide
public access to outdoor recreational areas such as surface waters
and shorelines.45 Where rural-area zoning is used to reach that ob-
jective, planners must clearly understand that such access must be
accomplished through acquisition programs or voluntary actions.'
Any attempt to impose a public easement on private land will likely
be viewed as an unconstitutional taking under the doctrine elabo-
rated in Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell II). "' Similarly, any attempt to
regulate private land so as to provide public facilities will also likely
be viewed as a taking.
Having thus set forth some of the problems raised by implementa-
tion of the Growth Management Act, the following three sections
develop the current status of regulatory takings in Maine.
II. TRACING THE DEVELOPMENT OF A STANDARD
A. The Early Cases
In 1834 the newly incorporated city of Bangor, Maine enacted a
zoning-type ordinance which declared that "[e]rections of wooden
buildings, within the limits prescribed, are declared unlawful
... ,'s Chief Justice Weston, in Wadleigh v. Gilman,40 compli-
be suspicious about the argument that things must be left as they are. PATRICIA
SOLOTAIRE & STERLING Dow. HL MANAGING RESIDENTIAL GRaowrm How YOUR Town
CAN Do IT 19 (1979) [hereinafter SOLOTAIRE & Dow].
43. QuintreU, supra note 30, at 7.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 147-63.
45. GumEIiNEs, supra note 26, at 40-41.
46. See, e.g., Jo Josephson, Purchasing Public Land, 52 MMiNE ToWNsAN 5
(1990) (describing recent state and municipal initiatives for purchasing public land).
47. 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) [hereinafter Bell Ill. See infra notes 189-198 and
accompanying text. The first decision, Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509 (Me.
1986), is commonly referred to as Bell L It addressed issues not pertinent to this
Comment.
48. Wadleigh v. Gilman, 12 Me. 403, 404 (1835).
49. 12 Me. 403 (1835).
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mented the city planners for their action. "It is an object, in the
highest degree worthy of the attention of the city authorities, to take
such measures . . . to lessen the hazard and danger of fire. No city,
compactly built, can be said to be well ordered or well regulated,
which neglects precautions of this sort."50 Nonetheless, certain own-
ers of lots within the protection zone, who were precluded from
moving wooden buildings onto those lots, challenged the constitu-
tionality of the-in their view-meddlesome law. The court upheld
the city's action. "Laws of this character are unquestionably within
the scope of the legislative power, without impairing any constitu-
tional provision. It does not appropriate private property to public
uses; but merely regulates its enjoyment." 51 Thus, the Law Court
established its earliest precedent on the taking question in land-use
law.
The Law Court's early focus on the regulatory taking question
treated it as akin to the right of eminent domain. In determining
whether a taking had occurred, the court emphasized the need to
evaluate the regulation's impact on the landowner's title. In
Cushman v. Smith,52 the court interpreted the word "taken" in the
Taking Clause of the Maine Constitution in the following manner:
"To take the real estate of an individual for public use, is to deprive
him of his title to it, or of some part of his title, so that the entire
dominion over it no longer remains with him. He can no longer con-
vey the entire title and dominion. '5 3 If the title to private property
was not affected by a regulation, no taking had occurred.
In Cushman, the controversy primarily involved the question of
just compensation. Nonetheless, the court attempted to articulate
the full scope of the taking clause. "The provision was not designed,
and it cannot operate to prevent legislation, which should authorize
acts, operating directly and injuriously, as well as indirectly upon
private property, when no attempt is made to appropriate it to pub-
lic use."5 The court concluded: "It was designed . . . to prevent the
owner of real estate from being deprived of it, or of an easement in
it, and to prevent any permanent change of its character and use
without compensation." 55 Thus, absent some impact on the prop-
erty's title, mere regulation of private land use did not constitute a
taking for constitutional purposes.
In an Opinion of the Justices," the Maine Supreme Judicial
50. Id.
51. Id. at 405.
52. 34 Me. 247 (1852).
53. Id. at 260.
54. Id. at 258.
55. Id.
56. 103 Me. 506 (1907). The actual title of this document as published in the re-
porter is "Questions and Answers." However, the title "Opinion of the Justices" more
aptly describes the document as an advisory opinion.
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Court approved of "this strict construction of the constitutional pro-
vision to property in land. '57 The justices were asked by the Maine
Senate58 to give their opinion on whether regulating the cutting of
trees on privately owned land, without paying compensation, would
result in an unconstitutional taking." The justices replied:
While [the regulation] might restrict the owner of wild and unculti-
vated lands in his use of them, might delay his taking some of the
product, might defer his anticipated profits, and even thereby
might cause him some loss of profit, it would nevertheless leave
him his lands, their product and increase, untouched, and without
diminution of title, estate or quantity. He would still have large
measure of control and large opportunity to realize values. He
might suffer delay but not deprivation. While the use might be re-
stricted, it would not be appropriated or "taken."05
This strict test of the Taking Clause, which in practice tended to
support most land-use regulation, prevailed unchallenged for many
years. In 1957 the Law Court was still relying on this test to resolve
the taking issue in State v. McKinnon."' In McKinnon, the Legisla-
ture had enacted a bill that created a new state game preserve and
prohibited any person from hunting or possessing firearms within
the preserve limits. 6 2 Two hundred and five acres of McKinnon's
285-acre tract were located within the boundaries of the game pre-
serve. When McKinnon was arrested for hunting on his own land,
but within the perimeter of the preserve, he challenged the constitu-
tionality of the statute. The Law Court held that the establishment
of the game preserve did not create a public easement. Conse-
quently, the court upheld the Legislature's action because "[t]he law
authorizing the State to establish game preserves on the property of
a private owner does not take from him any title, dominion of own-
ership or essential use." 3
B. State v. Johnson: The Court Finds a Taking
1. Casting the Issue
State v. Johnson represented a turning point in the Law Court's
analysis of the taking issue. For the first time the court, in a unani-
57. Id. at 511.
58. The Maine Constitution provides that "[tihe Justices of the Supreme Judicial
Court shall be obliged to give their opinion upon important questions of law, and
upon solemn occasions, required by the Governor, Senate or House of Representa-
tives." MF CONsT. art. VI, § 3. When the justices do so, they are referred to as the
Supreme Judicial Court rather than as the Law Court.
59. Opinion of the Justices, 103 Me. at 507-08.
60. Id. at 512 (emphasis added).
61. 133 A.2d 885 (Me. 1957).
62. Id. at 886.
63. Id. at 887.
64. 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
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mous decision, conceptualized a taking as other than an unreasona-
ble exercise of police power,65 or as an actual transfer to the public
of "title, dominion of ownership or essential use." 6 Johnson is also
the only Maine case to date where the court, absent some form of
physical impact,6 7 held that the operation of a state law as applied
to the use of a specific parcel of private property constituted a tak-
ing without compensation. Thus, Johnson is the seminal taking case
in any examination of Maine precedent bearing on the rural-area
zoning issue.
Johnson dealt with the operation of the original Wetlands Act s as
applied to use of the appellants' tract of coastal marshland. The Act
was "a conservation measure under the police power of the State to
protect the ecology of areas bordering coastal waters."09 It placed
restrictions upon the alteration and use of wetlands without permis-
sion from pertinent municipal and state officials. The Johnsons'
property consisted of a 220 x 700 ft. tract extending across an ex-
panse of saltwater marshes. The easterly third of the tract, prior to
passage of the Wetlands Act, had been filled and subsequently de-
veloped with seasonal dwellings. The westerly portion, which was
the subject of the case, remained a tidal wetland7 0 suitable for devel-
opment only "by raising the grade above high water by the addition
of fill . .. "71
Following the effective date of the Act, the Johnsons applied for
and were denied permission to fill a portion of their land. They sub-
sequently deposited fill on the land,72 as a result of which the State
sought and was granted an injunction under the Act in Superior
Court. The Johnsons appealed, claiming that the denial of the per-
mit and the granting of the injunction "so limit the use to plaintiffs
of their land that such deprivation of use amounts to a taking of
their property without constitutional due process and just compen-
sation. 1 3 The court stated the controversy in larger terms: "Be-
65. See Opinion of the Justices, 103 Me. 506 (1907).
66. See State v. McKinnon, 133 A.2d 885, 887 (Me. 1957).
67. See infra text accompanying notes 188-212.
68. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4701-4709, repealed by 1975 Me. Laws ch. 595,
§ 1 (current versions at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 480-C to 480-F, and 480-R
(West 1989 & Supp. 1990-1991)).
69. State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d at 713.
70. The court described the property as a "marsh-land flooded at high tide and
drained, upon receding tide, into the [Webhannet] River by a network of what our
Maine historical novelist Kenneth E. Roberts called 'eel runs' . . . ." Id.
71. Id.
72. The Johnsons first filed an administrative appeal from the denial of the per-
mit, which was remanded due to a lack of evidence on the nature of the property.
The appeal from the injunction corrected this deficiency, and the two cases were con-
solidated. Id. at 713.
73. State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d at 714 (footnote omitted). The reference to a due
process challenge as synonymous with a taking challenge was based on the language
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tween the public interest in braking and eventually stopping the in-
sidious despoliation of our natural resources which have for so long
been taken for granted, on the one hand, and the protection of ap-
pellants' property rights on the other, the issue is cast."7'
2. Holding: No Commercial Value is Equivalent to a Taking
In searching for a standard to guide its analysis, the Law Court
initially seemed content to draw upon the traditional approach de-
veloped in its own precedents. "The constitutional aspect of the cur-
rent problem is to be determined by consideration of the extent to
which appellants are deprived of their usual incidents of ownership
... .Our State has applied a strict construction of the constitu-
tional provisions as to land. ' 7 However, the Law Court then sig-
nalled that it was prepared to move beyond its earlier strict ap-
proach. Abandoning the title analysis embodied in Cushman v.
Smith, the court wrote: "Conditions so burdensome may be imposed
that they are equivalent to an outright taking, although the title to
the property and some vestiges of its uses remain in the owner. ' 6
Having thus set the tone of discussion, the court focused on what
it ultimately considered to be the controlling fact of this case. It
accepted the lower court's finding that "the area of which appel-
lants' land is a part 'is a valuable natural resource of the State of
Maine and plays an important role in the conservation and develop-
ment of aquatic and marine life, game, birds and waterfowl.' ""
Nonetheless, the court found decisive the lower court's finding that
"appellants' land absent the addition of fill 'has no commercial
value whatever.' "78 Consequently, the Law Court reversed the lower
of the Act itself:
§ 4704. Appeal
Appeal may be taken. . . for the purpose of determining whether the ac-
tion appealed from so restricts the use of the property as to deprive the
owner of the reasonable use thereof, and is therefore an unreasonable exer-
cise of police power, or which constitutes the equivalent of a taking without
compensation.
Id. at 713 n.1 (emphasis added).
The court stated that § 4704 "by its terms equates a deprivation 'of the reasonable
use' of an owner's property with 'an unreasonable exercise of police power.'" Id. at
714. Consequently, although the court performs an analysis of the taking question,
some of its reasoning is placed in the context of a due process discussion. Normally,
however, the due process issue is examined separately from the taking issue. Section
4707 of the Wetlands Act was repealed by P.L. 1975, ch. 595. § 1. The current author-
ity for initiating appeals is codified at Ma. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 346 (West 1989 &
Supp. 1990-1991).
74. State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d at 716.
75. Id. at 714 (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 715 (citation omitted).
77. Id. at 716.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
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court and held for the landowner, stating that "[t]he application of
the Wetlands restriction in the terms of the denial of appellants'
proposal to fill, and enjoining them from so doing deprives them of
the reasonable use of their property and within Section 4704 is...
equivalent to taking within constitutional considerations.7' Thus,
the standard proposed by Johnson is that where a land-use regula-
tion strips private land of all commercial development value, it con-
stitutes a taking.
3. State v. Johnson and the Following Decade
Johnson is significant because it demonstrates that taking consid-
erations should be a real concern to public planners implementing
the Growth Management Act's rural-area designation. The Law
Court recognized that, even for the best of purposes, the state can go
only so far in restricting what a private landowner can do with his
land. Johnson is less helpful, however, in determining exactly how
far the state can go. At most, it stands for the proposition that a
taking occurs when government regulation strips private land of all
commercial value. That does not mean, however, that a taking can
only occur when all commercial value has been eliminated. After
Johnson, it is still possible for a taking to occur when the state has
regulated less intensively than to strip away all commercial value.8 0
Nevertheless, Johnson tells us that rural-area regulation must leave
a private landowner with viable commercial alternatives to simply
walking upon and enjoying his property in an undeveloped
condition.
In the decade following Johnson, the Law Court had two opportu-
nities to build upon its holding in that case and thereby develop an
approach to the taking question more favorable to private interests.
As the following discussion indicates, however, the court declined to
do so. In two cases challenging the applied constitutionality of the
Site Location of Development Law,8" the court held that the statute
was valid because it did not impose an unreasonable burden on pri-
vate landowners. These "unreasonable burden" cases represent a
transitional stage in the development of the court's taking standard.
While the test of a taking they developed has not subsequently been
followed by the Law Court, the cases are instructive for the insight
they provide into what does not constitute a taking.
In In re Spring Valley Development,8' a developer was in the pro-
cess of subdividing a 92-acre tract on the shore of Raymond Pond.
The developer had received the local planning board's approval for
79. Id.
80. See discussion infra part IV.
81. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 481-490 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990-1991) (origi-
nally enacted by P.L. 1969, ch. 571, § 2).
82. 300 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973).
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the subdivision but had not sought or received approval from the
state in accord with the Site Location of Development Law. Conse-
quently, the Environmental Improvement Commission (EIC)8 3 is.
sued an order denying the developer the right to proceed with the
subdivision until it made a proper application to the Commission
and received the Commission's approval.8 '
The developer appealed the Commission's action by challenging
the constitutionality of the Act's application, primarily on due pro-
cess and equal protection grounds. 5 The developer also contended
that the application of the Act to its land amounted to a taking
without compensation. The court quickly dismissed the taking chal-
lenge as without merit. "Nothing in the record indicates that the
Act as applied constitutes such an unreasonable burden upon the
property as would equal an uncompensated taking."8 The court
cited Johnson as the source of this standard. "In fact," the court
pointed out, "the record demonstrates only that the Appellant's
land cannot be sold for residential purposes while subdivided to the
extent and in the manner Lakesites originally planned." 8" That did
not amount to an unconstitutional taking under the court's newly
articulated "unreasonable burden" standard.
The companion case, In re Maine Clean Fuels, Inc.," also in-
volved a constitutional challenge to the application of the Site Loca-
tion of Development Law. The EIC "denied the application of
Maine Clean Fuels, Inc. (MCF), requesting approval of its proposed
development of a petroleum refinery on Sears Island."8 The devel-
oper argued that the EIC order was "so restrictive as to constitute
an arbitrary taking."8' 0 Following the standard it formulated in
Spring Valley Development, the court held that:
[u]nlike the situation in State v. Johnson, in the record before us
there is no evidence relative to the 'extent of the diminution' in
value of Sears Island to its owners resulting from the EIC order.
Absent a showing that the EIC order resulted in "such an unrea-
sonable burden upon the property as would equal an uncompen-
sated taking," MCF's argument is not cognizable by this Court. 1
Thus, in the absence of evidence of unreasonable burden, not even a
restriction precluding a development as large as an oil refinery on a
83. P.L. 1971, ch. 618, § 12 substituted Board of Environmental Protection for
Environmental Improvement Commission.
84. In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d at 741.
85. The court upheld the constitutionality of the Act, as applied, on both the due
process and equal protection grounds. Id. at 751-54.
86. Id. at 749 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
87. Id.
88. 310 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973).
89. Id. at 739 (footnote omitted).
90. Id. at 742.
91. Id. at 742-43 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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privately owned island is enough to constitute a taking without
compensation.
C. Seven Islands Land Co.: The Court Articulates the Current
Standard
1. Rendering the Property Substantially Useless
In the early eighties the Law Court again updated its treatment of
the taking question. In Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use
Regulation Commission92 the court incorporated then recent United
States Supreme Court thinking on the taking issue into the develop-
ment of a standard under the Maine Constitution.9 3 The court wrote
that "the principal focus of the courts in 'taking' cases has become a
factual inquiry into the substantiality of the diminution in value of
the property involved."9' The court noted that the United States
Supreme Court had recently "required the diminution to be very
substantial indeed before a taking will be found."95 Thus, the court
concluded that "the mere extinguishment of one [property right]
does not necessarily amount to a taking. . . ."9 The decisive ques-
tion, said the court, is whether "its extinguishment would render the
property substantially useless."7 Notably, the court omitted any
reference to Johnson."
Seven Islands involved a challenge to the action of the Maine
Land Use Regulation Commission (LURC) in granting only a re-
stricted permit for timber harvesting on privately owned woodlands
in an unorganized township in Aroostook County.99 LURC had
placed certain land in the township, known as the Burpee Brook
deer yard, into a protected classification. All of the land so zoned
was located on private woodlands. "The effect of that zoning, which
was designed to protect the deer wintering habitat, was to foreclose
92. 450 A.2d 475 (Me. 1982).
93. In addition to quoting from Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the court also
borrowed language from Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); and Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Seven Islands Land Co. v.
Maine Land Use Regulation Comm'n, 450 A.2d at 482.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
98. DELOGU, supra note 3, manuscript at 96-97. The fact that the court did not
refer to Johnson indicates that the standard introduced in Seven Islands is, indeed,
new. One can infer, therefore, that land can be rendered substantially useless without
being stripped of all commercial value.
99. LURC has authorization for land-use regulation in unorganized and deor-
ganized portions of the state. ME. R.v. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 681-689 (West 1981 &
Supp. 1990-1991).
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timber harvesting ... except with a permit issued by LURC
"100
One of the plaintiff's primary attacks on LURC's action was a tak-
ing challenge. The Law Court stated that "[t]he proper procedure
for analyzing taking questions is to determine the value of the prop-
erty at the time of the governmental restriction and compare that
with its value afterwards, to determine whether the diminution, if
any, is so substantial as to strip the property of all practical
value."10' 1 The first step in this analysis, said the court, is to identify
the appropriate parcel of land to examine. "Because the principals
. . . own all of the 25,000 acre township in which the Burpee Brook
deer yard is situated, the parcel in question is the entire township.
Seven Islands proffers no evidence that the value of this parcel has
been diminished."1 2 Thus, resolution of the taking question became
easy-in fact, almost tongue in cheek. "Seven Islands' claim is that
denial of permission to cut any trees other than dead or dying fir on
432 acres of a 25,000 acre township and a temporary prohibition on
cutting another 118 acres of the same tract renders it substantially
useless. This claim must be rejected as a matter of law."103
Incidental to its primary analysis, the Law Court pointed out two
mistaken premises upon which Seven Islands Land Co. based its at-
tack. First, the court made clear that in determining whether certain
land has been rendered substantially useless, all profitable uses of
the land must be considered, not merely the desired use. "Seven Is-
lands simply asserts that the value of the land as timberland has
been destroyed, and hence the value of the land for any purposes is
zero. Seven Islands bases this claim on the assertion that the only
profitable use of the land is timber harvesting."10' Implicit in this
statement is the view that the land potentially had many alternative
commercial uses. Thus, by implication, a land-use restriction cannot
constitute a taking absent proof that all profitable uses of the land
have been precluded.
Second, although the multiple possible uses of a tract of land
must be considered, taking analysis should focus on the effect of the
regulation at the time the land-use restriction is challenged. "[I]n
'taking' cases there is no place for expectations of future profits ex-
cept to the extent those expectations are reflected in present market
value." 1' 0 5 Thus, when determining the diminution in value of land
after a governmental restriction, an estimate of future profits does
100. Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation Comm'n. 450 A.2d at
478.
101. Id. at 482 (citation omitted).
102. Id.
103. Id. (citation omitted).
104. Id. (emphasis in original).
105. Id. at 483.
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not enter into the calculation.
2. Applying "Substantially Useless" as a Standard
The test formulated in Seven Islands marked a significant change
in the Law Court's treatment of the taking issue. This test remains
the guiding principle for use in Maine courts today.100 Notwith-
standing the continuing vitality of State v. Johnson, the Law Court
at present looks to Seven Islands for functional limitations on land-
use regulation. As the following discussion indicates, all taking cases
since that decision have applied and developed the "substantially
useless" standard.
The first two taking cases to follow Seven Islands each involved
applications for variances from municipal zoning schemes. Like
other forms of land-use restrictions, municipal "[z]oning restrictions
can amount to a taking of property even though title and some uses
of the property remain with the owner."' 0 7 Indeed, the same stan-
dard applies. In Sibley v. Inhabitants of Wells, 08 a local zoning
board of appeals denied a landowner's application for a sideline set-
back and a minimum lot size variance to construct a house. In re-
jecting the taking claim, the Law Court wrote: "No taking exists un-
less the property has been rendered substantially useless. The
Sibleys' land has substantial use and value in conjunction with the
adjacent lot. No unconstitutional taking resulted . ...",,1o
In Curtis v. Main,"0 which also involved a variance application,
the Law Court again drew directly on its analysis in Seven Islands.
The court first found that "[g]iven the lots' position between water
and road, the lots would be worthless as residential property without
106. Recently, for example, the Superior Court in Kennebec County applied the
standard in Diamond Cove Associates v. Board of Envtl. Protection, No. CV-90-18
(Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty. 1990). Diamond Cove Associates applied for "a permit
under the Site Location of Development Law [ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 481-490
(West 1989 & Supp. 1990-1991)] for a 65 lot single family subdivision on 102 acres of
land on Great Diamond Island .... " Id. at 1. The lots were the second phase of a
larger project which already included renovation of existing structures into 134 con-
dominium units. Total estimated costs for the entire project had reached $23,000,000.
The Board of Environmental Protection denied the permit. In rejecting Diamond
Cove Associates' taking claim, the court wrote: "To seriously present this claim at
this time suggests a view of the law that says in essence that denial of an application
which would allow development to maximize profits from the land amounts to a tak-
ing. Nowhere is taking law stated so broadly." Id. at 17 (citations omitted). Further.
more, the court pointed out that a significant number of the Phase II lots, although
not all sixty-five, would eventually receive approval. Consequently, the court held
that "[tihe ability to profit from Phase I and to sell some [Phase II] lots after slight
reconfiguring hardly renders the land 'substantially useless' which is what petitioner
must demonstrate to prove a taking claim." Id.
107. Curtis v. Main, 482 A.2d 1253, 1258 (Me. 1984) (citations omitted).
108. 462 A.2d 27 (Me. 1983).
109. Id. at 31 (citations omitted).
110. 482 A.2d 1253 (Me. 1984).
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setback variances."' Nonetheless, the court held:
Although there was no clear evidence of potential nonresidential
uses developed below, the plaintiffs did not prove the absence of
nonresidential beneficial uses. The burden was on the plaintiffs to
prove that the subsequently enacted ordinance and the Board's re-
fusal to grant variances rendered their property substantially use-
less. Because the plaintiffs failed to meet this burden, we cannot
find that the Board unconstitutionally deprived the plaintiffs of
their property. 2
Evidentiary problems in one form or another are a common
thread in most recent taking cases. In Maine Land Use Regulation
Commission v. White," 3 LURC had zoned 61 acres of a 102-acre
farm as a permanent wildlife habitat protection zone in order to pre-
serve a deer wintering area. " The court held that LURC's action,
which precluded timber harvesting in the zone, was not the
equivalent of a taking "on the basis of the Whites' own testimony
that the property has not been substantially reduced in value.""'
Similarly, in Molasses Pond Lake Association v. Soil and Water
Conservation Commission,"'s "[n]o extended discussion of the issues
raised. . . on appeal [was] required." 7 The county Soil and Water
Conservation Commission issued to the owner of a dam an order
setting a lake's maximum water level-a level which the dam con-
trolled. The dam owner objected because specific structural modifi-
cations to the dam were required in order for the dam to be capable
of meeting the mandated water levels. The court quickly disposed of
the taking claim, stating: "as there [was] no evidence establishing
that the Association's property was rendered 'substantially useless'
by the Commission's order, there has been no unconstitutional
taking. ' nW
In Hall v. Board of Environmental Protection,"" the court found
that no taking had occurred because the landowners failed to pre-
sent any believable evidence that their property had been rendered
substantially useless by restrictive regulation.120 The Halls owned an
111. Id. at 1257.
112. Id. at 1258 (citations omitted).
113. 521 A.2d 710 (Me. 1987).
114. The Whites tried unsuccessfully to distinguish their case from Seven Islands
on the basis of the larger percentage of acreage affected by the restriction. Id. at 713.
See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
115. Id. at 713. The court also noted that the Whites had no basis for a taking
claim because "the 'taking', if any, occurred at the time of LURC's permanent zoning
decision before the Whites acquired the property." Id.
116. 534 A.2d 679 (Me. 1987).
117. Id. at 680.
118. Id. at 680-81 (citing Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation
Comm'n, 450 A.2d at 482).
119. 528 A.2d 453 (Me. 1987).
120. Id. at 456. This was on the second appeal. The first appeal had been re-
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oceanfront cottage which was lost due to storms and rapidly advanc-
ing beach erosion. The Halls then began "using their property dur-
ing the summer months by living in a fully equipped 27-foot motor-
ized camper connected to all utilities." 2 ' This was standard practice
in the area. The court noted "that there was a steady occupancy of
seasonal residential units on all sides of the Hall property, including
trailer and recreational vehicle sites." '2 In fact, comparable proper-
ties abutting the Halls' land had sold for substantial sums of money.
Thus, when the Board of Environmental Protection, under the au-
thority of Maine's Sand Dune Law, 23 denied the Halls' application
for a sand dune permit to construct a permanent residential struc-
ture on the property, the court held that this did not constitute a
taking. "It is clear from the preponderance of the believable evi-
dence that beneficial and valuable uses of their property remain
available to the Halls despite the denial of a building permit by the
BEP. Accordingly, we hold that there has been no taking of the Hall
property .... 124
The land-use restriction imposed on the Halls' property severely
restricted the ways in which it could be developed. Nearly all devel-
opment options were precluded. However, the property was not ren-
dered substantially useless because the limited use that did remain
had significant commercial value. Thus, Hall demonstrates that
land-use regulation can dramatically restrict range of use without
constituting an illegal taking, provided that the beneficial use that
does remain has real value.
III. IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS IN APPLYING THE TAKING
STANDARD
Simply tracing the development of a unifying standard in Maine
taking cases will not yield a complete understanding of the issue.
Seldom will a narrow application of the standard be sufficient to
predict or encompass the Law Court's reasoning. For example, the
United States Supreme Court has recognized that its decisions up-
holding land-use regulations, which are reasonably related to a valid
state objective "uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in
property value, standing alone, can establish a 'taking'.
manded to address the taking issue. The court there wrote: "[Tihe Plaintiffs assert
that without approval of their application for a sand dune permit, the property is
rendered substantially useless. That is sufficient to state a claim . "Hall v. Board
of Envtl. Protection, 498 A.2d 260, 267 (Me. 1985).
121. Hall v. Board of Envtl. Protection, 528 A.2d at 455.
122. Id. at 456.
123. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 471-478 (1964), repealed by P.L. 1977, ch. 300,
§ 29 and P.L. 1987, ch. 809, § 1 (current version at ME. REv, STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 480-
C to 480-F, 480-Q, 480-R (West 1989 & Supp. 1990-1991)).
124. Hall v. Board of Envtl. Protection, 528 A.2d at 456 (emphasis added).
125. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978) (citing
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While the Law Court has not expressly said the same regarding the
"substantially useless" standard, the cases indicate that the Law
Court recognizes "several factors that have particular significance"
in resolving a taking challenge. 2 '
The following discussion examines each of these factors to deter-
mine how they affect the Law Court's taking analysis. The first sec-
tion describes those considerations which typically control or but-
tress the court's analysis. The second section describes two
subsidiary factors which often accompany a taking challenge. One
factor is shown to be a good predictor of the court's disposition of a
taking claim; the other is shown to be largely irrelevant to the taking
analysis. Finally, section three demonstrates how one considera-
tion-physical impact-is so significant to the Law Court's analysis
that it calls for the application of its own taking standard.
A. Controlling or Supporting Factors
1. Defining the Property in Question
Before the Law Court can engage in an analysis of whether a gov-
ernmental restriction has rendered privately owned land substan-
tially useless, it must first decide the extent of the land upon which
to properly focus. 127 In taking cases where the tract in question is in
some manner associated with adjoining acreage under the same own-
ership, this becomes a critical factor in determining the success or
failure of the taking claim because the unrestricted portion of the
property may be able to generate a reasonable return for the whole
tract.
The Law Court has generally considered taking claims in the con-
text of the broadest view of the tract. When it has done so, it has
never found a taking. In Seven Islands, the court refused to focus on
the impact of the restriction on the 2,700 acres of deer yard, choos-
ing instead to consider the taking claim in the context of the 25,000-
acre privately owned township in which the deer yard was situ-
ated.128 "In determining the amount of diminution, the focus is on
the interference with the rights in the parcel as a whole, not merely
the portion immediately affected."12
generally Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1916)).
126. Id. at 124.
127. For instance, the United States Supreme Court has written: "[One of the
critical questions is determining how to define the unit of property 'whose value is to
furnish the denominator of the fraction.'" Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (quoting Michelman, Property, Utility. and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1192 (1967)).
128. Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation Comm'n, 450 A.2d at
482.
129. Id.
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Similarly, in Sibley v. Inhabitants of Wells," 0 where the land-
owner owned two additional lots contiguous to the lot in question,
the court declined to consider the single lot in isolation. The court
noted that the lot had "substantial use and value in conjunction
with the adjacent lot."'13 Thus, the denial of the Sibleys' variance
request did not amount to a taking.
The Law Court's predilection to consider the affected land in its
broadest context is also followed by the lower courts. For example,
in Diamond Cove Associates v. Board of Environmental Protec-
tion,1 32 where land-use restrictions on the portion of the land allo-
cated to the second phase of a two-phase development were chal-
lenged, the Superior Court justice wrote: "The ability to profit from
Phase I and to sell some lots after slight reconfiguring hardly ren-
ders the [Phase II] land 'substantially useless.' ","3 By focusing on
the broadest view of land ownership in each case, the court avoids
classifying governmental land-use restrictions as unconstitutional
takings.
On the other hand, the Law Court has at least once narrowly fo-
cused on the affected portion of a larger tract of land. In Johnson, in
which the court found that a taking had occurred, the inquiry fo-
cused on the undeveloped westerly portion of the 700-foot-long
tract. 34 The easterly portion of the tract had been filled and devel-
oped prior to the effective date of the Wetlands Act. 10 One can
surmise that the court narrowed its focus due to the fact that the
Site Location of Development Law became effective in between
stages in the tract's development. However, the court did not explic-
itly state the reason for its narrow focus. Thus, since Johnson has
not subsequently been limited or repudiated, the Law Court has left
unresolved the issue of how narrowly a court should focus its taking
inquiry. 36
130. 462 A.2d 27 (Me. 1983).
131. Id. at 31.
132. No. CV-90-18 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., 1990). See supra note 106 and ac-
companying text.
133. Id. at 17.
134. State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d at 713.
135. Id.
136. Furthermore, in Maine Land Use Regulation Comm'n v. White, 521 A.2d 710
(Me. 1987), the Law Court failed to clarify whether the relative size of the land per-
centages affected by a restriction makes a difference in a taking analysis. "The
Whites attempt[ed] to distinguish Seven Islands Land Co. on the disparate percent-
age of their total acreage affected by the zoning as compared to the percentage im-
pact in Seven Islands." Id. at 713. In White, 61 acres of a 102-acre farm (60%) were
affected by the restrictions, whereas in Seven Islands Land Co. only 2,700 acres of a
25,000-acre township (11%) were affected. The court concluded that "the attempted
distinction is unavailing for two reasons." Id. The reasons the court offered, however,
have nothing to do with invalidating this attempted distinction. First, the court noted
that if any taking occurred, it did so before the Whites acquired the property. Id.
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2. Reciprocity
The rationale the Law Court uses to justify upholding restrictions
on the use of private property is based on a theory of reciprocity.,"
In Maine, the theory was explicitly stated as early as 1835 in
Wadleigh v. Gilman:
Police regulations may forbid such a use, and such modifications,
of private property, as would prove injurious to the citizens gener-
ally. This is one of the benefits which men derive from associating
in communities. It may sometimes occasion an inconvenience to an
individual; but he has a compensation, in participating in the gen-
eral advantage.1 38
When the Law Court perceives that the balance between burdens
and benefits is appropriate, it will find that the government action
does not constitute a taking. For example, in holding that the chal-
lenged application of the Site Location Law did not amount to a
taking, the court in In re Spring Valley Development3 0 invoked the
reciprocity doctrine and traced its development from the 1907 Opin-
ion of the Justices14 0 and York Harbor Village Corp. v. Libby. 4 '
However, when the Law Court perceives that the landowner is car-
rying a disproportionate burden in relation to the generalized bene-
fit he receives, the court is likely to find that the regulation consti-
tutes a taking.142
In Johnson, after finding that application of the Wetlands Act
stripped the landowner's property of all commercial value, the court
invoked the reciprocity doctrine in explaining why this result was
unacceptable:
The benefits from [the wetland's] preservation extend beyond town
limits and are state-wide. The cost of its preservation should be
publicly borne. To leave appellants with commercially valueless
Second, the court pointed out that the Whites' own testimony established that the
property had "not been substantially reduced in value." Id. Neither of these state-
ments, however, resolves the question of how important the percentage of total land
affected by a restriction is to the determination of whether a taking has occurred.
137. The United States Supreme Court has described the theory as follms:
"Under our system of government, one of the State's primary ways of preserving the
public weal is restricting the uses individuals can make of their property. While each
of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the
restrictions that are placed on others." Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 491 (citations omitted).
138. Wadleigh v. Gilman, 12 Me. at 405.
139. 300 A.2d at 746-48.
140. 103 Me. 506 (1907).
141. 126 Me. 537 (1928).
142. This follows United States Supreme Court thinking on the doctrine. "The
determination that governmental action constitutes a taking is, in essence, a determi-
nation that the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of
an exercise of state power in the public interest." Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255, 260 (1980).
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land in upholding the restriction presently imposed, is to charge
them with more than their just share of the cost of this state-wide
conservation program, granting fully its commendable purpose. 
4
3
Because the generalized benefits conferred on the affected land-
owner by the public program were so disproportionate to the depri-
vation of use imposed on the landowner, application of the Wetlands
Act constituted an unreasonable exercise of the State's police
power.
144
Similarly, in Kittery Water District v. Town of York, 45 where the
court disallowed a local planning board's attempt to impose a recre-
ational-use .condition on a permit to construct a reservoir, the court
wrote: "[Wie find no authority for imposing such a burden on pri-
vate property. The Planning Board sought to 'force [the District] to
bear a disproportionate burden in the providing of public facilities'
.. .. , Thus, considerations of reciprocity play an important sup-
porting role in determining whether a taking has occurred.
3. Nuisance Doctrine
In resolving a taking dispute, the outcome of the Law Court's
analysis often turns on how the government regulation under attack
is depicted.1 4 7 In nearly every case in which the Law Court has
viewed the regulation as a measure to prevent some form of public
harm, it has refrained from holding that the law constitutes a tak-
ing. 1 48 For instance, in State v. Lewis1 49 the court tersely disposed of
143. State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d at 716.
144. The court placed its conclusion within the framework of a substantive due
process discussion, rather than within the context of a taking analysis, due to the
court's interpretation of § 4704 of the Wetlands Act. See supra note 73.
145. 489 A.2d 1091 (Me. 1985).
146. Id. at 1094 (alteration by Law Court) (footnote omitted) (quoting Pacific Le-
gal Found. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 180 Cal. Rptr. 858, 865 (Ct. App. 1982),
rev'd in part as not ripe, 655 P.2d 306 (Cal. 1982)).
147. This parallels a theme common to United States Supreme Court analysis of
the issue. "Many cases before and since Pennsylvania Coal have recognized that the
nature of the State's action is critical in takings analysis." Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 488. For instance, "'prohibition simply upon the
use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to
the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a
taking or appropriation of property.'" Id. at 489 (quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S,
623, 668-69 (1887)) (emphasis added). Furthermore, "[tihe Court's hesitance to find a
taking when the State merely restrains uses of property that are tantamount to pub-
lic nuisances is consistent with the notion of 'reciprocity of advantage' that Justice
Holmes referred to in Pennsylvania Coal." Id. at 491.
148. See, e.g., Molasses Pond Lake Ass'n v. Soil and Water Conservation Comm'n,
534 A.2d 679 (Me. 1987); Hall v. Board of Envtl. Protection, 528 A.2d 453 (Me. 1987);
Maine Land Use Regulation Comm'n v. White, 521 A.2d 710 (Me. 1987); Seven Is-
lands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation Comm'n, 450 A.2d 475 (Me. 1982); In
re Maine Clean Fuels, Inc., 310 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973); In re Spring Valley Dev., 300
A.2d 736 (Me. 1973); State v. McKinnon, 153 Me. 15, 133 A.2d 885 (1957); Wadleigh
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the taking issue on this basis alone. The defendant in Lewis was
convicted of maintaining an automobile junkyard in violation of a
city ordinance. While the appeal was denied principally on proce-
dural grounds, the taking issue was dealt with entirely in a footnote:
"[Appellant's] collateral argument that the effect of the ordinance
was an unconstitutional taking of his property overlooks the fact
that private property is held subject to the implied condition that
its use will not injure or impair the public interest."' 0 Thus, merely
recognizing a statute as a measure for preventing a public nuisance
significantly reduces the likelihood that the government action will
be held to constitute a taking.
This, however, is not always the rule. In Johnson, the court gave
full measure to the importance of the Wetlands Act in "eventually
stopping the insidious despoliation of our natural resources
"151 The court noted that the landowner's property was part of
'a valuable natural resource of the State of Maine ... ' "152 and
that the "Act is a conservation measure under the police power of
the State to protect the ecology of areas bordering coastal wa-
ters."'5 3 Nonetheless, the court held that application of the Act to
the landowner's property constituted a taking. Thus, when the effect
of a restriction is to strip private property of all commercial value,
not even recognizing the act as a measure to prevent substantial
public harm is sufficient to protect it from a taking challenge.'
Furthermore, when a land-use regulation is perceived as creating a
public use or benefit, it is more likely to constitute a taking.' 5 In
Bell II, for instance, the Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act was
found to create "an easement for use by the general public for 'rec-
v. Gilman, 12 Me. 403 (1835). All the variance cases are implicitly reviewed in this
context. See Curtis v. Main, 487 A.2d 1253 (Me. 1984); Sibley v. Inhabitants of Wells,
462 A.2d 27 (Me. 1983); Barnard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 313 A.2d 741 (Me. 1974);
Lovely v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 259 A.2d 666 (Me. 1969). The nonconforming-use
cases are explicitly dealt with from this perspective. See Senator Corp. v. Commis-
sioner of Transp., 511 A.2d 37 (Me. 1986); State v. National Advertising Co., 409 A.2d
1277 (Me. 1979); Inhabitants of Boothbay v. National Advertising Co., 347 A.2d 419
(Me. 1975).
149. 406 A.2d 886 (Me. 1979).
150. Id. at 889 n.5.
151. State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d at 716.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 713.
154. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has explicitly recognized this limi-
tation to the nuisance analogy. "[O]ur cases have never applied the nuisance excep-
tion to allow complete extinction of the value of a parcel of property." Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
155. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 128
(1978) ("[G]overnment actions that may be characterized as acquisitions of resources
to permit or facilitate uniquely public functions have often been held to constitute
'takings.' ").
1992]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
reation' without limitation.' ' 5 Thus, the Act constituted "a taking
of private property for a public use.11 7 In Brown v. Warchalow-
ski, 58 the court found that the limited private rights of way created
by statute "are open to public use and the easement rights therein
belong to the public . . . ." As a result, there was no dispute that
the petition to lay out the right of way, "if successful, would consti-
tute a taking in the constitutional sense." 60 In Kittery Water Dis-
trict v. Town of York,'' a recreational-use condition was distin-
guished from "an equitable swap for the loss of a very good wildlife
nesting habitat," and characterized instead as "a disproportionate
burden in the providing of public facilities."' 6 2 Consequently, the
condition was disallowed. Indeed, as early as Cushman v. Smith the
court declared: "The design [of the taking clause] appears to have
been simply to declare, that private property shall not be changed to
public property, or transferred from the owner to others, for public
use, without compensation . . . ,,113 Therefore, whenever a govern-
ment burdens a private landowner by appropriating a public use or
benefit, rather than by regulating to prevent a public harm (albeit
indirectly benefitting the public), the Law Court is more likely to
equate the action to a taking.
B. Subsidiary Considerations
1. The Relationship to Variance Hardship Analysis
When a zoning ordinance imposes a land-use restriction on a land-
owner, and the landowner's subsequent variance application is de-
nied, the zoning agency's action is typically challenged on both un-
due hardship and taking grounds.' 6 ' The Law Court approaches
each challenge in a distinct manner. However, in view of the current
statutory definition of undue hardship, it will be shown that the
analysis of the taking question and the analysis of the first test of
undue hardship are coextensive. Consequently, resolution of one is-
sue provides a means of predicting the outcome of the second issue.
Maine's municipal zoning statute'65 provides that a zoning board
of appeals may grant a variance only in strict compliance with un-
due hardship criteria. 6 6 The requirement is based on two due pro-
156. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 176.
157. Id. at 177.
158. Brown v. Warchalowski, 471 A.2d 1026 (Me. 1984).
159. Id. at 1029. See infra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
160. Id.
161. Kittery Water Dist. v. Town of York, 489 A.2d 1091 (Me. 1985).
162. Id. at 1094. See infra text accompanying note 206.
163. Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247, 258 (1852).
164. See Bishop v. Town of Eliot, 529 A.2d 798 (Me. 1987); Curtis v. Main, 482
A.2d 1253 (Me. 1984); Sibley v. Inhabitants of Wells, 462 A.2d 27 (Me. 1983).
165. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, §§ 4351-4359 (West Supp. 1990-1991).
166. § 4353(4).
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cess concerns. The first is that "[v]ariances should not be easily or
lightly granted and a variance should be the exception and not the
rule."16 The second is that the exercise of discretion by boards of
appeals in granting or denying a variance appeal not be arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable. 68 Despite its origin in due process con-
cerns, the undue hardship analysis simultaneously addresses the un-
constitutional taking standard.
The portion of the zoning statute controlling the granting of vari-
ances reads in pertinent part:
4. Variance. The board may grant a variance only when strict
application of the ordinance to the petitioner and the petitioner's
property would cause undue hardship. The term "undue hardship"
as used in this subsection means:
A. The land in question cannot yield a reasonable re-
turn unless a variance is granted .... 10
The court has interpreted this statutory language to mean the fol-
lowing: "Reasonable return is not maximum return ... . The reason-
able return prong of the undue hardship test is met 'where strict
application of the zoning ordinance would result in the practical loss
of all beneficial use of the land.' ",170 This language is essentially the
same as that used in Seven Islands to articulate the taking standard
of rendering the land "substantially useless."1 7' Recognizing that the
two standards converge at this point provides a ready predictor of
how the Law Court will decide a taking issue once the undue hard-
ship issue has been addressed.
For instance, where the court finds that a variance request has
been properly denied because the reasonable-return prong of the
hardship criteria has not been met, it follows that no taking has oc-
curred under the current "substantially useless" standard. There-
fore, it is only in those variance cases where the reasonable-return
test of undue hardship is met that the court need proceed further
with a taking analysis.
Functionally, this was the result in Curtis v. Main.17 2 In its hard-
ship analysis, the Law Court determined that "[o]n the evidence
presented the Board was not compelled to conclude that the [first]
undue hardship test had been satisfied.' 1 3 In its taking analysis the
court restated its hardship finding in the language of the taking
167. Lovely v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 259 A.2d 666, 670 (Me. 1969).
168. Barnard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 313 A.2d 741, 748 (Me. 1974).
169. Title 30-A, § 4353(4).
170. Curtis v. Main, 482 A.2d 1253, 1257 (Me. 1984) (citation omitted) (quoting
Thorton v. Lothridge, 447 A.2d 473, 475 (Me. 1982)).
171. See Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation Comm'n, 450
A.2d at 482.
172. 482 A.2d 1253 (Me. 1984).
173. Id. at 1257-58 (citation omitted).
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standard; no taking occurred because the plaintiffs failed to prove
that "the Board's refusal to grant variances rendered their property
substantially useless."'1 4 Because the court supported the Board's
conclusion on the hardship analysis, no valid taking challenge could
exist.
2. Nonconforming Uses
The Law Court has had little opportunity to decide whether it is
relevant to the taking question if a land-use restriction merely pre-
cludes proposed uses, or terminates non-conforming structures or
uses. At the federal level, the Supreme Court has written that" 'tak-
ing' challenges have also been held to be without merit in a wide
variety of situations when the challenged governmental actions pro-
hibited a beneficial use to which individual parcels had previously
been devoted . . . . 15 In Maine, the important taking cases have
involved land-use restrictions which impinge upon proposed uses.1 '
However, in a line of cases dealing specifically with billboard regula-
tion, the Law Court has indicated that classification of a use or
structure as nonconforming has little relevance to the taking
question.
In Inhabitants of Boothbay v. National Advertising Co.,' 7 7 the
Town enacted an ordinance prohibiting "all off-premise billboards
and advertising signs in the Town. . . that are 'visible from a public
way.' ,,17 The ordinance allowed a tolerance period of ten months
for nonconforming signs existing at the effective date of the ordi-
nance. The Law Court held that "[tlhe consequences of the instant
ordinance are not a taking .... ,1*"7 It explained: "the defendant
has not demonstrated to us or to the trial court that the actual
property interest in the signs, as to their cost or intrinsic value, is
substantially impaired or vitiated by the mandated removal."'18
The fact that the signs were already in existence was relevant only
to emphasize how substantially the property interest was impaired.
"We cannot say that the expectancy of maintaining a billboard rises
to the level of an immutable or vested right. . . . Compensation is
due only when the impairment is so substantial as to amount to a
174. Id. at 1258 (citation omitted).
175. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 125.
176. For example, the Law Court avoided addressing the issue of nonconforming
use in Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation Comm'n, 450 A.2d at
481, by concluding that pre-harvest timber management in deer yards "is merely
preparation for use, [which] does not rise to the level of being actual or substantial
for the purposes of nonconformity."
177. 347 A.2d 419 (Me. 1975).
178. Id. at 421.
179. Id. at 424.
180. Id. at 424. Interestingly, the court does not cite to Johnson (or to any other
taking case) to support its standard for reviewing the taking issue in this case.
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taking."81 Since here the billboard was "neither condemned, nor
S.. seized and dedicated to a public purpose" 182 the ordinance did
not amount to an unconstitutional taking.183
In Senator Corp. v. Commissioner of Transportation,'" the issue
of existing use was argued with a different twist, but with a similar
result. The billboard mandated for removal had been in place for
over twenty-five years. However, since neither the appellant nor its
predecessor in title had ever sought a permit for the sign, the bill-
board was not considered a nonconforming use, and thus was liable
for immediate removal. Consequently, rather than adopting a ver-
sion of the arguments used in Inhabitants of Boothbay v. National
Advertising Co. and State v. National Advertising Co., Senator ar-
gued that "the Act effects a taking of the land immediately beneath
the sign."185
The Law Court rejected this argument. The court stated that the
"sign's removal must substantially impair or vitiate Senator's inter-
est in that land" in order to constitute a taking. 80 The court found,
however, that removal of the sign did not satisfy this test. "The bill-
board occupies a tiny fraction of Senator's whole parcel. Further-
more, the record shows that Senator plans a subdivision of its large
parcel. Those plans could easily include the land now used for the
sign." ' Thus, the billboard line of cases suggests that taking analy-
sis under the Maine Constitution is unaffected by whether the chal-
lenged regulation restricts either an existing use or a proposed use.
C. The Role of Physical Invasion
Cases challenging government regulation creating a public right of
physical occupation or nontrespassory invasion of privately owned
land constitute a distinct category of taking law.'8 A taking is
nearly always found in such cases, in which the Law Court applies a
181. Inhabitants of Boothbay v. National Advertising Co., 347 A.2d 419, 424 (Me.
1975).
182. Id.
183. In State v. National Advertising Co., 409 A.2d 1277 (Me. 1979), the Law
Court reaffirmed its reasoning in Inhabitants of Boothboy. Additionally, the court
explained that the nonconforming use amortization period is relevant to the taking
issue only if it seriously reduces the property's value. Id. at 1289.
184. 511 A.2d 37 (Me. 1986).
185. Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 38-39.
188. The U.S. Supreme Court, for instance, has recognized "that where govern-
mental action results in '[a] permanent physical occupation' of the property,. . . 'our
cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard
to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal eco-
nomic impact on the owner.'" Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. at 831-
32 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35
(1982)).
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different standard than that used to review challenges to mere limi-
tations on private land use. In Maine, the role of physical invasion
in taking cases is best developed in Bell H1.189
The Law Court in Bell II held that Maine's Public Trust in Inter-
tidal Land Act19 "on its face constitutes an unconstitutional taking
of private property.""9 The court found that in passing the Act, the
Legislature "imposed upon all intertidal land . . . an easement for
use by the general public for 'recreation' without limitation." 92 Con-
sequently, the court held that "[s]ince the Act provides no compen-
sation for the landowners whose property is burdened by the general
recreational easement taken for public use, it violates the [Taking
Clauses] in both our State and Federal Constitutions .... ,,1,s
The analysis the Law Court used to reach its holding was very
different from the standard it had developed under the Seven Is-
lands line of cases. The court began by returning to its early empha-
sis on the effect of the legislative action on "title, dominion of own-
ership or essential use."'9 " It noted that "long ago" in Cushman v.
Smith the court had addressed the significance of physical invasion
to taking cases. "[The Takings Clause] was designed to operate and
it does operate to prevent the acquisition of any title to land or to
an easement in it. . ."95 To buttress and expand on its own pre-
cedent, the court adopted an argument from an early Massachusetts
case. "The interference with private property here involves a whole-
sale denial of an owner's right to exclude the public. If a possessory
interest in real property has any meaning at all it must include the
general right to exclude others. 1 9 6
The court explicitly addressed its rationale for not applying the
"substantially useless" standard to physical invasion cases. "The
public recreational easement taken by the Maine Act over ocean-
189. 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).
190. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 571-573 (West Supp. 1990-1991).
191. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 177. This is also the only case in which the Law Court
has sustained a facial challenge, rather than an as-applied challenge, to a land-use
regulation.
192. Id. at 176.
193. Id. at 177. One observer, however, has written that the Law Court "erred in
several significant ways in its constitutional analysis of the Intertidal Land Act, and
by so doing, seriously short changed both the just compensation clause and the public
trust doctrine." Rieser, supra note 19, at 11. The purpose of this Comment, however,
is not to evaluate whether the Law Court's decision in Bell H was right or wrong, but
to accept it as part of the legal landscape in Maine and ascertain what it tells us
about the court's taking standard.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 48-63.
195. 557 A.2d at 177 (emphasis added) (quoting Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. at
265).
196. Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 568 (Mass. 1974) (quoting NIClOLS,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.1[11 (Rev. 3d ed. 1970)), quoted in Bell v. Town of Wells, 557
A.2d at 177.
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front owners' land must be distinguished from the governmental ac-
tion regulating private land use that we have in recent years ex-
amined under the Takings Clause." ' The court cited to the line of
cases beginning with Seven Islands. It explained that the "[Seven
Islands] analysis becomes inappropriate, however, when the issue
before us is the constitutionality of a statute that authorizes a physi-
cal invasion of private property."'9 8
The Bell II court, however, had precedent more recent than
Cushman v. Smith to support its physical invasion doctrine. ' "
While it did not explicitly develop its reasoning in Brown v.
Warchalowski,0 0 nor explain why it was not applying the "substan-
tially useless" standard to the taking issue, the court treated Brown
like a physical invasion case. Warchalowski had petitioned the
town2 0 to lay out a private right of way following the course of a
discontinued town road across Brown's land. The town granted the
petition, subject to gates and bars, and awarded $1 in damages to
Brown.20 2 The Law Court noted that the town's action created "a
public easement as in the case of the laying out of any other state
highway or county road.21 0 3 Thus, the court held that the laying out
of the way, "if successful, would constitute a taking in the constitu-
tional sense."2 4 The court explained its reasoning:
In order to result in a constitutional "taking," it is not necessary
that the owner of property actually be removed from his property
or completely deprived of its possession, but merely that an inter-
est in the property or in its use and enjoyment be seriously im-
paired, such as when inroads are made upon an owner's title or an
owner's use of the property to an extent that, as between private
parties as in this case a servitude will attach to the land.210
Implicit in the standard applied is the court's fear that the servitude
in question was a public easement which would authorize physical
invasion of Brown's private property. As the Law Court later articu-
lated in Bell II, the creation of public easements must be distin-
guished from government action which merely regulates private land
use.
20 o
197. Id.
198. Id. See also Rieser, supra note 19, at 9.
199. Contra Rieser, supra note 19, at 14 (arguing that the Law Court had no legal
or policy basis in its case law for applying a physical invasion doctrine.).
200. 471 A.2d 1026 (Me. 1984).
201. Pursuant to former ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3001 (1964), repealed by
P.L. 1979 ch. 253, § 1.
202. Warchalowski v. Brown, 417 A.2d 425, 428 (Me. 1980). This was the first
appeal in the case.
203. Brown v. Warchalowski, 471 A.2d at 1029.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. The physical invasion doctrine explicitly developed in Bell II, and implicitly
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Indeed, the physical invasion doctrine clarifies what the Law
Court was alluding to in Foss v. Maine Turnpike Authority20 7 Foss
involved the issue of whether sovereign immunity protected the
Maine Turnpike Authority from an action for damages brought by a
landowner with property abutting the turnpike. The landowners
complained "that the Turnpike Authority's snow removal operations
[had] resulted in runoffs of salt onto their property over a consider-
able period of time, resulting in the pollution of plaintiffs' water
supplies, defoliation of their crops . . . and assorted other damage
.. .. 208 The Law Court held that the landowners could bring an
action against the Authority under certain exceptions to the sover-
eign immunity doctrine. "[O]ne avenue of compensation still open to
the plaintiff," the court observed, was a taking challenge. °0 The
court went on to suggest that on the facts before it the Authority's
actions might constitute a taking. In doing so it anticipated the
physical invasion doctrine it later developed in Bell 11.
The Foss court began by stating: "In order to constitute a consti-
tutional 'taking,' it is not necessary that the plaintiff actually be re-
moved from his property or deprived of its possession, but merely
that an interest in the property, or in its use and enjoyment, be seri-
ously impaired." 10 This was certainly a less strict test than the Law
Court had been willing to apply in taking cases from Cushman v.
Smith through Johnson. However, the court seemed to recognize
that the physical contact with the landowner's property distin-
guished this case from the standard regulatory taking cases.
Accordingly, since its own physical invasion doctrine was not yet
developed, the Law Court drew support from a United States Su-
adopted in Brown v. Warchalowski, is consistent with, and provides a more powerful
basis for, the Law Court's decision in Kittery Water Dist. v. Town of York, 489 A.2d
1091 (Me. 1985). The Water District, a quasi-municipal corporation holding its land
as private property, applied for a permit from the local planning board to construct a
reservoir on its property. The planning board in turn attempted "to impose as a con-
dition to the granting of the permit that the District open access to the District's
private water supply to those, in this particular case, wishing to fish or go boating."
Id. at 1093. The court disallowed the condition, holding that "[b]ecause we find that
the ... Board had no authority to impose such uses, it is unnecessary at this point to
reach the issue of whether the condition lends itself to an unconstitutional 'taking'
under the Maine Constitution." Id. at 1094. The court based its holding on a ques-
tionable interpretation of the pertinent state statute. Indeed, the court qualified its
tenuous analysis: "We decline, however, to rule ... that the Planning Board is with-
out authority to impose public recreational use conditions under any circumstance."
Id. at 1094. Therefore, rather than base its holding on an ambivalent interpretation
of ambiguous statutory language, the court could have based its holding on the physi-
cal invasion doctrine and resolved the case in a manner that would have provided
useful general guidance to other boards.
207. 309 A.2d 339 (Me. 1973).
208. Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
209. Id. at 344.
210. Id.
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preme Court case in which actual contact played a determinative
role. It quoted from United States v. Dickinson,2" where a govern-
ment dam had caused public waters to inundate private property,
"noting that 'property is taken in the constitutional sense when...
a servitude has been acquired either by agreement or in course of
time.' "212 This is the same concern the court would subsequently
voice in Brown v. Warchalowski. Clearly, the Law Court viewed the
Authority's physical invasion of the land through its salting opera-
tions as imposing a servitude on the land for the public use. An in-
vasion of this nature would constitute a taking, regardless of
whether the landowner's interest in or use of the property was seri-
ously impaired.
IV. LOCATING THE LIMITS TO UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS
The Maine cases make clear that state and local governments are
accorded great latitude in regulating the use of private land.2 " The
apparent reluctance of the Law Court to incorporate Johnson into
its subsequent case law indicates a strong concern for the public in-
terest in land-use regulation. Unless the application of a land-use
restriction to a particular property renders the parcel substantially
useless, it is unlikely that a court in Maine will find that the restric-
tion constitutes a taking for which compensation must be paid. This
standard, however, applies only to laws which merely regulate pri-
vate use. If the restriction creates or recognizes any form of public
servitude in private property, giving the public a right to actually
enter upon the land, a court will likely find a taking without regard
to considerations of diminution of property value.
Provided that no physical invasion is involved, however, the diffi-
cult question is determining at what point the property is rendered
substantially useless. At the outer limit the court recognizes that
land is rendered substantially useless when it is stripped of all com-
mercial value for any viable economic use. Thus, while government
has significant power to regulate land use, the limit to that power is
defined in terms of some residual ability of the property owner to
develop the property. That may only mean the ability of a land-
owner to install a temporary recreational vehicle on the property for
seasonal use, but it means more than restricting the landowner to
enjoying her land in an unimproved state. This holds true no matter
how worthy the government objective embodied in the regulation.
On the other hand, this does not mean that a landowner has a
211. 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947).
212. Foss v. Maine Turnpike Auth., 309 A.2d at 344.
213. See generally In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d at 746-48. ("It seems self-
evident in these times of increased awareness of the relationship of the environment
to human health and welfare that the state may act-if it acts properly-to conserve
the quality of air, soil and water." Id. at 746.).
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right to pursue the development plan of his choice. A government
land-use restriction may completely bar a particular form of land
use, as long as other beneficial commercial uses of the land remain.
Similarly, merely restricting a private landowner's ability to maxi-
mize profits from a particular land use is never a taking. Further-
more, it does not matter to the taking question whether the restric-
tion precludes a proposed use or an existing use. Unless the
restriction leaves the property substantially useless for any develop-
ment purpose, it is unlikely to constitute a taking.
The question the case law leaves unanswered, however, is whether
there is some minimum intensity of land-use regulation that is suffi-
ciently burdensome to constitute a taking. In principle, it seems
clear that there must be such a possibility. The standard the Law
Court has used since Seven Islands employs the term "substan-
tially," not "completely," to modify the adjective "useless." More-
over, since the Law Court has infrequently mentioned Johnson in
its taking decisions, Johnson must be viewed as illustrating merely
the extreme case-an outer limit-within which a taking can occur,
not as establishing the definitive requirement for all takings. Thus,
there is in principle some minimum level of regulation-an inner
limit-beyond which government action likewise becomes equivalent
to an illegal taking.
We know that regulating timber harvesting in deer yards does not
get beyond this inner limit, nor does restricting the scope of con-
struction on sand dunes. Zoning for minimum lot size, setback re-
strictions, or building material requirements has proven not suffi-
ciently burdensome, nor has the disapproval of site permits for
subdivisions or oil refineries. The list goes on, but a mere enumera-
tion fails to make the inner threshold any clearer. This is because in
trying to locate an inner limit it is unlikely "that diminution in
property value, standing alone, can establish a 'taking' ... .14
Therefore, factors which the Law Court has indicated are important
to evaluating the taking standard assume increased importance.
For instance, in examining a taking challenge to a land-use re-
striction the Law Court adopts the broadest view of the affected
property. Indeed, the court even tends to consider the property in
the context of the surrounding landscape.215 In doing so, the court is
unlikely to find that a land-use restriction constitutes a taking be-
cause the land nearly always has some value in conjunction with, or
in comparison to, its surroundings. Consequently, in order for a re-
striction whose impact is less harsh than in Johnson to constitute a
taking, it is likely that circumstances must be such as to cause the
court to focus on the smallest unit of land in question.
214. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 131 (citations
omitted).
215. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, considerations of reciprocity and the nature of the re-
striction become important in a less restrictive land-use regulatory
climate. Where a landowner can make a case for being forced to
shoulder a disproportionate share of the costs of a restriction, in re-
lation to the generalized benefits she receives, the Law Court will
probably be more willing to find a taking. Concomitantly, where a
landowner can characterize a land-use regulation as a means to ap-
propriate facilities or impose servitudes for public use, rather than
as a measure to prevent a public nuisance, the court will be more
likely to find a taking. Thus, it is likely that the inner limit to how
far state government can go in regulating private land use will be
defined in terms of how substantially useless a property has been
rendered, and how significantly the Law Court views other factors
such as the extent of the property, reciprocity, and the nature of the
restriction.
V. CONCLUSION
A. Constraints on Growth Management Imposed by the Taking
Clause
The constraint placed upon state and local land-use officials by
the Maine Constitution's taking clause is real and increasingly rele-
vant. As state and local land-use regulation becomes more restrictive
and all-encompassing in the wake of the Growth Management Act's
passage, the right of private landowners to derive economically ben-
eficial uses from their land is arguably being diminished. As state
and local planners work to protect not only natural resources and
sensitive ecological areas, but rural character and open space as well,
the tendency is to forget-or fail to recognize-that there is a con-
stitutional limit to how far a regulation can go before it constitutes
an illegal taking.
The case law indicates that, at the outer limit, land-use regulation
that renders a piece of property substantially useless for any eco-
nomic development constitutes a taking. This is true no matter how
laudable the government objective. Similarly, regulation that creates
or recognizes a public easement or servitude over private land also
constitutes a taking. However, it is arguably also true that regula-
tion that stops short of stripping a private parcel of all commercial
value, or permitting a physical invasion of the land by the public,
can likewise result in a taking. The outcome in such a situation de-
pends upon the other variables important in taking jurisprudence.
The Growth Management Act does not appear on its face to con-
stitute a taking. Nevertheless, the language used in the official
Guidelines for the Comprehensive Planning and Land Use Regula-
tion Act goes far beyond the provisions contained in the Act itself.
The Guidelines state that "[r]ural areas are not intended to be areas
19921
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set aside for future growth."216 The Guidelines recommend that
"[i]n some areas, due to physical constraints or state, regional or
local policies, development should be prohibited. 2 17 Furthermore,
with regard to critical natural resources, "[m]unicipalities are en-
couraged to adopt more stringent regulations." 218 These official rec-
ommendations suggest to local planners that they have a greater au-
thority to regulate private land use than the case law indicates is
constitutional. As Johnson indicates, even in the most sensitive ru-
ral areas, privately owned land cannot be stripped of all commercial
value via regulation and thereby rendered substantially useless, else
a taking will be found to have occurred. Thus, the direction con-
tained in the Guidelines would probably be sufficient by itself, if it
had the force of law, to constitute a facial taking. At the very least,
the Guidelines seriously mislead local officials about the power they
have to regulate private land use.
Furthermore, application of the Act's rural-area designation raises
several taking questions. These are most pronounced where some
form of cluster zoning or large minimum lot size scheme is imple-
mented. For instance, if through cluster zoning a large portion of a
private tract is required to be preserved as open space, the tract's
value in conjunction with a small area of clustered development may
nonetheless be substantial. Accordingly, the cluster zoning might
not cross the inner limit of government regulation sufficient to vio-
late the taking clause. Conversely, if density limits cause very large
portions of otherwise developable land to be left in an undeveloped
state with perhaps only one residence permitted per landholding,
application of the density limits may constitute a taking if they are
found to render the tract substantially useless. While such regula-
tory schemes may be advocated for their desired effect on values
such as rural character and open space, their potential to exceed the
limit of acceptable restrictions on private land must be acknowl-
edged by planners and local officials.2 19
One observor has written that "a single model for guiding growth
does not exist [under the Growth Management Act]. ' '1 0 The Act
does not advocate any specific technique of land-use management.
The Act merely specifies that "policies and ordinances may include,
without limitation: density limits; cluster or special zoning; acquisi-
tion of land or development rights; or performance standards
.... ,21 Other options include: restricting permitted land uses, re-
216. GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at 44.
217. Id. at 45.
218. Id. at 48.
219. Cf. SOLOTAIR & Dow, supra note 42, at 19 (describing how a large-lot zoning
scheme was struck down).
220. Quintrell, supra note 30, at 7.
221. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4326(3) (A) (West Supp. 1990-1991).
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stricting road access points, 222 establishing resource production
zones, establishing buffer requirements, and establishing a transfer
of development rights (TDR) program.2 2 No blanket statement can
be made evaluating all the options from a taking perspective. The
application of each of these techniques must be examined to ensure
that they do not render property substantially useless.
B. Modeling the Future of an Imaginary Maine Town
One organization has attempted to envision how the growth man-
agement program might unfold in an imaginary Maine community.
The Natural Resources Council of Maine (NRCM) has used build-
out maps22 ' to chart projected residential development under three
land-use strategies in the fictitious town of Deerfield.22 1 The town
they envision has characteristics typical of many small Maine com-
munities.226 It has a traditional village center, with development
gradually spread out along major roads. The landscape surrounding
the town is scenic, with many small working farms and woodlots. A
significant amount of the land within town limits consists of wet-
lands and other unbuildable terrain. Residents hunt, hike, and
snowmobile on the large private tracts with the permission of the
landowners. The population, currently at 2,000, is expected to grow
at a rate of twenty percent, or 400 people, by 2010, and eventually
reach a population of 14,000.
Growth management option number one is to establish a one-acre
minimum lot size in the growth area and a two-acre minimum for
the rural area. "This is typical of development patterns in many
Maine communities that do not have significant restrictions on resi-
dential development in rural areas. '2 27 Clearly, due to the low inten-
sity of the land-use restrictions, no taking issues are likely to arise.
In the NRCM scenario, however, the result after twenty years is
that there are fewer working farms, less public access to recreational
lands, a loss of scenic landscapes, and development sprawl. In the
long term, Deerfield loses all of its working farm and forest lands,
and public outdoor recreational opportunities are limited. NRCM
regards this as the worst scenario.
Growth management option number two requires cluster develop-
222. "A municipality may regulate access to its public roads but in doing so it
must be cautious .... A road access ordinance must not deny property access to
the public road system. To do so may be an unconstitutional taking of property rights
without compensation." SOLOTAIRE & Dow, supra note 42, at 45-46.
223. Quintrell, supra note 30, at 8-9.
224. Build-out maps trace the projected growth of a community at specific inter-
vals of time, e.g., 5, 10, and 20 years.
225. Jerry Bley, Facing the Future in Deerfield, The Implications of Three Dif-
ferent Land Use Strategies, MIMNE GROWTH MANAGEMENT NEws, Fall 1990, at 4.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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ment for subdivisions in the rural areas. "For example, a twenty-
acre subdivision could have ten residential lots which are clustered
on no more than ten acres of land; the remaining ten acres are per-
manently protected as open space. '228 According to the NRCM sce-
nario, this results in great improvements in maintaining the rural
landscape with all its associated amenities. From a taking stand-
point, the scheme raises more questions but appears constitutionally
sound. It is unlikely that a tract of private land will be viewed as
substantially useless if some of it must be left open while growth is
clustered on some portion of it. A community will get into difficulty,
however, if it attempts to impose any form of public easement for
recreation or access to recreation areas on the privately owned open
spaces. Such common use by the subdivision residents as part of the
ownership rights attaching to their private lots would clearly be al-
lowed, but the town will have difficulty extending this into a general
public right. This step is precluded under the physical invasion doc-
trine enunciated in Bell 11.229
Growth management option number three encourages more dense
development in growth areas, but ensures strict protection for rural
areas. The town achieves its rural-area objectives through strict zon-
ing and limiting density to one residential unit per twenty acres. Ac-
cording to the NRCM, the result of this scenario is that "[t]he rural
areas of the community remain largely unchanged both in appear-
ance and use. ' 230 However, the strict development limits throughout
the town's rural areas raise serious taking questions. Imposing a
twenty-acre minimum lot size on undeveloped land has the potential
to render private property substantially useless. The taking issue is
clearest if the property has only marginal forestry or agricultural po-
tential but has good soils for building. Many undeveloped lots of less
than twenty acres would, at least theoretically, be precluded from
developing any beneficial commercial uses. Where the property does
not contain critical wildlife habitat, or delicate ecological areas, it
will be hard to frame the land-use restrictions as nuisance protec-
tion measures. Rather, they will appear to be measures to appropri-
ate benefits, such as rural character and scenic views, for the public.
Furthermore, although this scenario purports to present a future
where "[o]utdoor recreation opportunities are plentiful,' '2 3 1 this may
not be the case. Even though large blocks of private land might be
kept undeveloped, the town will still have no authority to impose
public servitudes on the land. Consequently, rather than leading to
a future where "the majority of the town's land remains rural, '23 2
228. Id. at 5.
229. 557 A.2d 168, 177-78; see supra text accompanying notes 189-98.
230. Bley, supra note 225, at 6.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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and thus supposedly available for public recreational use, the growth
management restrictions of option three may suppress the town's
growth without achieving the town's rural-character planning
objectives.
In a companion article to "Facing the Future in Deerfield,"' 23 the
NRCM concludes: "Provided that they are rationally conceived and
applied, most land-use laws are likely to withstand challenge from a
legal perspective. Private property rights, therefore, become an issue
of public policy and values, not legal debate.""2 3 Unfortunately, a
review of taking law indicates that this is not the case. Although the
Law Court has shown a readiness to support the strong use of gov-
ernmental police power in land management, it has nonetheless rec-
ognized that there is a limit to the restrictions state or local govern-
ment can place on private land use. This limit is not made irrelevant
by claiming salutary objectives, rational thought, or proper legisla-
tive procedures. To suggest that as long as state and local planners
satisfy these criteria they will enjoy an unfettered hand in adminis-
tering the Growth Management Act, is to send the wrong signal. It
may be true that "[b]y designating growth and rural areas, towns
establish a framework for directing future growth to appropriate ar-
eas and away from areas that deserve protect[ion]. It is through
these designations that towns can strike the balance between conser-
vation and development interests." '235 However, without a complete
understanding of Maine taking law, local governments will be una-
ble to strike a constitutional balance between their exercise of au-
thority and the rights of private landowners.
Michael A. Duddy
233. See supra note 225.
234. Id. at 7.
235. Quintrell, supra note 30, at 9.
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